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eral sovereignty, and Lockean natural rights might even end up
precise enough to avoid the need to pursue higher levels of generality, and thus the problem of arbitrariness could be contained.
When we needed Constitutional change, then, we would not rely
on the judges' senses of how higher levels of Lockean theory
would resolve the problem, we could-as Gerber quite wisely
recommends as a check on the Justices (pp. 139-144)-simply use
the Article V process, and amend the document.
But this last is the familiar rant of the reviewer that if he
were writing the book he would have written a different one.13
On Gerber's own terms his book ought to be regarded as a successful and quite comprehensive proposal for rethinking Constitutional law in general and the selection and operation of
Supreme Court Justices in particular. It is written with sparkle
and passion and with a lucidity rare in works about Constitutional hermeneutics. It deserves to be widely read, debated, and
improved upon by other scholars and by Gerber himself. Indeed,
To Secure These Rights ought to attract the attention not only of
scholars of constitutional law, but of those of history, politics,
and moral philosophy. Perhaps it will even do its part in bringing
us back the kind of synthesis of those fields that the framers enjoyed, and without which interpretation faithful to the original
understanding cannot take place.

LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE. By
Gerald Gunthef.l New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp.
ix, 818. Cloth, $39.00; Paper, $19.95.
John WertheimerZ

Like countless other students, I got my first serious exposure
to the intricacies of American constitutionalism through the
pages of Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, the leading
casebook in the field. At the time, I thought it strange that, amid
13. Made more ironic here because I did, and attempted to derive supra-constitutional principles, and apply them to present problems in much the same way that Gerber
did. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 4). He does a much better
job than I did, however, at clearly laying out a coherent and widespread understanding of
his particular brand of extra-constitutional interpretive guides, tackles a wider field of
contemporary problems, and offers a more expansive set of remedies for containing judicial arbitrariness. (pp. 134-61)
1. Professor of Constitutional Law, Stanford University.
2. Assistant Professor of History, Davidson College.
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the unending parade of precedent-setting Supreme Court opinions (they appear in my memory, furiously underlined and maddeningly dense), the book included a First Amendment decision
that, besides coming from a lowly federal district court, appeared
to set no precedent whatsoever, for superior tribunals immediately rejected its speech-protective reasoning. The decision in
question was Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten;3 its author was a
federal judge memorably named Learned Hand.
Today, Professor Gunther's decision to include Masses in his
casebook seems less mysterious. For one thing, Hand's elegant
First Amendment reasoning blazed a trail that, though not followed at the time, was picked up decades later by the Warren
Court. For another thing, it happens that Gunther, in 1953-54,
served as Learned Hand's law clerk. By including Masses in his
casebook, thus, Gunther was at once mourning a legal path not
soon enough taken and celebrating the memory of his mentor,
Learned Hand, one of the greatest judges in American history.
In Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge, Gunther's masterful
biography, this celebration continues.
Gunther's weighty book follows its subject from cradle to
grave, leaving few stones unturned along the way. It begins in
1872, the year of Billings Learned Hand's birth to a respectable
Albany family. At fourteen, young Learned experienced the
death of his father, a successful appellate lawyer; for the rest of
his life, Hand would despair of ever approaching his father's professional stature-even after he had far surpassed it. Gunther
traces both Hand's admirable humility and his sometimes paralyzing self-doubt to this source.
Learned Hand attended Harvard College, which affected
him both personally and intellectually. His exclusion from
Harvard's elite social clubs reinforced feelings of insecurity.
(One productive byproduct of this exclusion, Gunther suggests,
may have been Hand's lifelong opposition to discrimination, including that practiced by his alma mater against Jews.) Meanwhile, Harvard's brilliant philosophy faculty, above all George
Santayana, William James, and Josiah Royce, validated
Learned's emerging intellectual skepticism and inspired in him a
spirit of inquiry and open-mindedness that would stay with him
for the rest of his life.
So inspired was Learned by his philosophy professors that
he seriously considered graduate study and a career in that field.
3.

244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
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His continued lack of confidence, however, left him vulnerable to
family pressures to abandon his dream and, like his father, grandfather, and two uncles before him, study law. In his twenty-first
fall, therefore, Hand turned his back on philosophy and, somewhat grudgingly, entered the Harvard Law School.
To his surprise, Hand took readily to legal study. As always,
he excelled in his classes. Less expectedly, he found actual inspiration in the teachings of his best instructors, especially Professor
James Bradley Thayer, an impressive thinker whose staunch opposition to judicial activism became a torch that Hand himself
would carry long after Thayer's death in 1902.
Graduation from law school in 1896 sent Learned out into
the world for the first time. He did not fare well. Hand's reflective nature, so well matched to legal study, was utterly unsuited
to legal practice. He tried hard to establish himself as a lawyer,
first in Albany and then in New York City, but so modest was his
success that it registered in his own mind as failure. Happily,
Hand found two interests outside his profession to lift his spirits
during those cheerless years: a growing involvement in the world
of social reform, and Frances Fincke, a bright, charming, Bryn
Mawr graduate whom Hand courted and wed. Gunther's sensitive discussion of Learned and Frances's imperfect relationship
illuminates both the day's conventions and the Hands themselves; it adds richly to the book. (Indeed, I felt a real sense of
loss when Frances slipped almost entirely from view after
Learned's judicial career took off; Learned, Gunther shows, felt
this loss more deeply still.) Having thus filled in the background,
Gunther then sketches Hand as most famously remembered:
robed in black, imposing brow knit, gavel in hand. Learned first
struck this pose in 1909, when President William Howard Taft
appointed him to the federal bench; and in that pose he would
remain-serving first as a federal district judge and then, after
1924, as a member of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-for an impressive fifty unbroken years. Hand's exceptional
performance won for him every conceivable mark of judicial distinction save one: elevation to the United States Supreme Court.
Despite frequent rumors that he was next in line, Hand, for reasons painstakingly detailed by Gunther, never made it to the nation's highest bench.
In Gunther's extensive discussion of Hand's judicial career,
four principal themes emerge. First, throughout his time on the
bench, Hand wrestled with a dilemma faced by all politically engaged judges: how to balance the imperative of judicial impartial-
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ity against the urge to participate actively in public affairs.
Although never drawn to partisan politics, Hand avidly followed
public controversies. At times, his passion overcame him and
swept him into action. This was especially true early in his judicial career, as in 1912, when he became an important adviser to
Theodore Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" presidential campaign, even
while occupying a place on the federal bench. Although Hand
disciplined himself more effectively as he matured, he never fully
reconciled his native impulse to engage in public controversies
with his judicial obligation to stay above them.
Gunther's second theme involves Hand's unswerving commitment to free speech. Having learned from his undergraduate
philosophy studies to distrust absolutist dogma and to value open
inquiry, Judge Hand sought throughout his career to expand the
range of permissible expression as much as possible within the
confines of existing law. From the aforementioned Masses opinion of 1917, wherein Hand bravely defended the right of leftist
dissenters during World War I, to his opposition to McCarthyism
some three-and-a-half decades later, Learned Hand, Gunther
shows, compiled an impressive record as one of the century's
true champions of free expression.
Third, Gunther details Hand's firm commitment to judicial
restraint. From the Gilded Age through the Great Depression,
American courts were notorious for striking down popular reform statutes on vague Constitutional grounds. Hand utterly opposed such interference with the legislative will. Indeed, in five
decades on the federal bench, he voted only twice to void statutes for constitutional reasons. And it mattered not whose ox
was being gored. Up through the New Deal, Hand's opposition
to judicial activism made him a liberal, for the laws most often
struck down in those years were progressive social reforms such
as maximum-hour laws for workers.4 Subsequently, however,
when courts turned their activist powers away from conservative
goals and toward liberal ones (as happened, most famously, in
Brown v. Board of Educations), Hand's continued advocacy of
judicial restraint left him at odds with one of the main currents of
post-war legal culture and damaged his standing among liberals.
4. See, most infamously, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a
New York law banning the employment of bakers for more than 10 hours per day or 60
hours per week was unconstitutional for violating the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment). Hand wrote a stinging response to the Lochner decision: Due Process of
Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1908).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For Hand's doubts regarding Brown, see Learned Hand,
The Bill of Rights (Harvard U. Press, 1958).
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Gunther's first three themes, thus, concern Judge Hand's approach to big issues: the balance between law and politics, the
limits of free expression, and the legitimacy of judicial review in
the American constitutional system. Theme number four, in contrast, concerns Hand's approach to the sorts of little issues that
came before his bench daily. Nowhere, Gunther shows, did the
judge loom larger. Like Mozart and music, Learned Hand, by
intellect and temperament, was perfectly suited to the art of judging. His flexible mind sought out all perspectives on an issue
before settling on a decision. Possessed of an extraordinary capacity for mastering technical detail, Hand repeatedly untangled
even the most complex fact situations to lay bare the essential
legal issues below. In the same manner, his tireless labors enabled him to locate hidden complexities in cases that others
wrongly saw as open-and-shut. To top it all, Hand was a literary
craftsman who wrote with clarity and elegance.
The passages in which Gunther brings Hand's judicial labors
to life are some of the best in the book. They show Judge Hand
rolling up his sleeves, spitting on his palms, and wrestling one
legal conundrum after another to the mat. In one typical passage, Gunther sketches Hand bent over past tide tables and
weather reports, drawing diagram after diagram, determined to
get to the bottom of a disputed ship collision. (p. 307) In another passage, we see Hand sitting alone through a specially
scheduled theatrical performance, testing with his own eyes allegations of copyright infringement. (p. 319) Little wonder, then,
that Hand's decisions impressed the U.S. Supreme Court as "the
best Federal Court opinions that come before us for review." (p.
272)

Learned Hand is an impressive book. To prepare it, Gunther cast a research net both broad of reach and fine of weave.
In this net, he hauled in literally thousands of court opinions;
tens of thousands of letters, manuscripts, and speeches; and several illuminating interviews. One example of Gunther's research
mastery will suffice: while discussing the college days of Frances
Fincke, the woman who would later marry Learned Hand, Gunther quotes revealingly from the diary of Mildred Minturn, one
of Frances's Bryn Mawr housemates. Where did Gunther
unearth this research gem? Simple: he found it in Fordingbridge,
Hampshire, England, in the possession of his biographical subject's wife's college housemate's daughter! (p. 90)
The extensiveness of Gunther's research enables him to reward his readers steadily with fascinating tidbits. For instance,
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although most readers will be aware that Theodore Roosevelt's
1912 presidential campaign bore the intellectual markings of
Herbert Croly's The Promise of American Life,6 how many know
that it was Learned Hand who first commended Croly's book to
TR? How many will know that Hand was a pioneer in the development of judicial clerkships? That Felix Frankfurter was married (by Benjamin Cardozo, no less) in Hand's chambers? That
Hand, late in life, developed a warm friendship with the famously
reclusive J.D. Salinger? Well, it's all true, and Gunther has the
footnotes to prove it.
Prodigious research, however, is but one of several strengths
that Gunther brings to his task. Gunther's own legal expertise is
another; it makes him a sure-footed guide to the sometimes
tricky legal and constitutional terrain that Judge Hand himself
traversed. Furthermore, Gunther's experience as Hand's law
clerk enables him to escort his readers directly into Hand's chambers. "In writing his memos and opinions," Gunther reports,
"Hand worked with a legal-size pad of yellow paper, which he
propped on a board resting on his knees or set on his desk." Occasionally, Hand would lay down his pen and break into song,
filling his chambers with "old Calvinist hymns, sea chanteys, and
G[ilbert] & S[ullivan] numbers." (pp. 290, 415) Who but a former law clerk would know these wonderful details? (Of course,
intimacy presents dangers as well as advantages to the biographer. The possibility of bias is always present when people write
about revered mentors. To Gunther's credit, however, only occasionally-as when he seeks, persuasively though still defensively,
to blame Hand's opposition to Brown v. Board of Education on
the unfortunate influence of Felix Frankfurter-does the author
seem to cover up for his former boss.)
Finally, Learned Hand excels precisely where one might expect a book by a law professor about a judge to fail: when dealing
with non-legal matters. Gunther moves confidently beyond
Hand's legal career in two directions. First, he zooms outward to
consider broader issues of twentieth-century history. Because
Hand was an active correspondent and a close follower of world
events, Gunther is able to illuminate both the judge and the
march of twentieth-century history by showing how the former
wrote about the latter. In this manner, Gunther provides interesting perspectives on issues ranging from the Sacco-Vanzetti
case and Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing scheme (Hand
6.

Herbert David Croly, The Promise of American Life (Macmillan Co., 1909).
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was not particularly outraged by either) to birth control and
American diplomatic internationalism (Hand favored both).
Besides moving outward beyond Hand's legal career, Gunther moves inward to reveal Learned Hand, the man. He does
this with a compassionate understanding of what it means to be
human, enabling him to paint a nuanced, humane portrait of his
subject. He describes Hand's imposing strengths without making
him appear invincible, and reveals Hand's less abundant but still
striking weaknesses without making him seem pitiful.
The result is the most fully realized biography of this impressive man yet written. Indeed, the fullness and authoritativeness
of Gerald Gunther's account of the life of Learned Hand might
never be surpassed.
No reader will deny that Learned Hand is an admirably
thorough biography; ungenerous readers, however, might come
to have mixed feelings about this attribute. All facets of Hand's
life seem to receive the same meticulous attention. Hand's temporary falling out with his friend Walter Lippmann becomes in
Gunther's book half a chapter; Hand's failure to be nominated to
the Supreme Court becomes two chapters. But perhaps a narrative that occasionally runs low on steam is inevitable when a biographer as conscientious as Gunther writes an 800-page account
of a subject whose wide paper trail covered nine decades and
whose professional greatness was as undramatic as was Hand's.
Perhaps, too, lengthy detail is the unavoidable price of
authoritativeness.
Ungenerous readers might also conclude that the historical
implications of the book are limited. Some other judicial biographies-Leonard Levy on Chief Justice Shaw comes to mind7 make strong arguments regarding eras in legal history, arguments
that easily can inform both classroom teaching and scholarly debate. In contrast, although Gunther's book does contribute effectively to some historiographical controversies-why Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for instance, converted from opposition to celebration of free speech, or why Hand and Lippmann
7. Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw
(Harvard U. Press, 1957). It should be noted that Levy's biography of Shaw is much less
comprehensive than Gunther's biography of Hand. Unlike Gunther, for instance, Levy
focuses almost exclusively on his subject's judicial output, paying but scant attention to
his life off the bench. Furthermore, even in analyzing Shaw's legal output, Levy makes no
claims of comprehensiveness, opting, by his own admission, for "depth on a few matters
rather than breadth of coverage." (5) Nonetheless, or perhaps consequently, Levy's historical arguments have much more bite and are much more broadly resonant than
Gunther's.
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experienced their discord-these controversies are not major
ones. Consequently, Gunther's book works better as a human
study than as a way of helping us to rethink legal history.
But if this is a shortcoming-as I am not entirely sure that it
need be-it is one that suggests the continuing influence of
Learned Hand on his former clerk. After all, just as Judge Hand,
in deciding court cases, deferred to precedent, declined to impose his political preferences, and practiced judicial restraint, so
Professor Gunther, in writing about Hand's life, defers to the historical record, declines to impose his subjective interpretations,
and practices what might be called biographical restraint.
Indeed, interpretive temperance is but one among several
attributes shared by Judge Hand and his biographer. Undogmatic liberalism, attention to detail, even-handedness,
supreme professionalism, intellectual integrity: it is a tribute to
Gerald Gunther that these characteristics of Learned Hand, the
man, also characterize Learned Hand, the book. The judge's life,
and this fine book, suggest two findings: first, that if our system is
to work well, it demands the contributions of people who, like
Learned Hand, work hard, are fair minded, and excel at what
they do; and second, that the rest of us owe a debt of appreciation to such people for their contributions, no matter how unglamourous. We, the beneficiaries both of Learned Hand's legal
craftsmanship and of Gerald Gunther's meticulous scholarship,
owe double.

